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Abstract
In this paper we give a short introduction to logic programming approach to knowledge
representation and reasoning. The intention is to help the reader to develop a ‘feel’ for the field’s
history and some of its recent developments. The discussion is mainly limited to logic programs
under the answer set semantics. For understanding of approaches to logic programming built on
well-founded semantics, general theories of argumentation, abductive reasoning, etc., the reader is
referred to other publications.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
If we want to design an entity (a machine or a program) capable of behaving intelligently
in some environment, then we need to supply this entity with sufficient knowledge about
this environment. To do that, we need an unambiguous language capable of expressing
this knowledge, together with some precise and well understood way of manipulating sets
of sentences of the language which will allow us to draw inferences, answer queries, and
update both the knowledge base and the desired program behavior. A good knowledge
representation language should allow construction of elaboration tolerant knowledge
bases, i.e., bases in which small modifications of the informal body of knowledge
correspond to small modifications of the formal base representing this knowledge. Around
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1960, McCarthy [83,84] proposed the use of logical formulas as a basis for a knowledge
representation language of this type. It was soon suggested, however, that this tool is not
always adequate [94]. This may be especially true in modeling commonsense behavior
of agents when additions to the agent’s knowledge are frequent and inferences are often
based on the absence of knowledge. It seems that such reasoning can be better modeled by
logical languages with nonmonotonic consequence relations which allow new knowledge
to invalidate some of the previous conclusions. In precise terms a consequence relation
|= (over language L) is called nonmonotonic if there are formulas A and B and a set
of formulas T such that T |= B and T ,A |= B . Obviously the consequence relation of
classical logic does not satisfy this property and is, therefore, monotonic.
The above observation has led to the development and investigation of new logical
formalisms, nonmonotonic logics. The best known of them are circumscription [85,86],
default logic [111], and nonmonotonic modal logics [88,89,95]. All of these logics are
super-classical, i.e., can be viewed as an extension of classical predicate or propositional
logic.
Another direction of research, started by Green [55], Hayes [56] and Kowalski [61],
and continued by many others, combined the idea of logic as a representation language
with the theory of automated deduction and constructive logic. This led Kowalski and
Colmerauer to the creation of logic programming [61,62,124] and the development of a
logic programming language, Prolog [23].
Even though logic programming and nonmonotonic logic share many common goals
and techniques, for some time there were no strong ties between the two research
communities. Originally, Prolog was defined as a small subset of predicate calculus. This
dialect of Prolog is now called Pure Prolog. The restricted syntax of Pure Prolog makes it
possible to efficiently organize the process of inference, while its semantics relies heavily
on the classical, model-theoretic notion of logical entailment. Unlike nonmonotonic
logics, with their emphasis on expressiveness, efficiency and development of programming
methodology seemed to be the main concern of the logic programming community.
With time, however, Prolog evolved to incorporate some nonclassical, nonmonotonic
features, which made it closer in spirit to the nonmonotonic logics mentioned above. The
most important nonmonotonic feature of modern Prolog is negation as failure. The initial
definition of this construct, incorporated in the original Prolog interpreter, was purely
procedural, which inhibited its use for knowledge representation and software engineering,
as well as for the investigation of the relationship between logic programming and other
nonmonotonic formalisms. Work, started by Clark and Reiter in the late 1970s [30,110],
was aimed at the development of a declarative semantics for logic programs with negation
as failure. Further work in this direction proved to be fruitful for logic programming as well
as for artificial intelligence and databases. The results uncovered deep similarities between
various, seemingly different, approaches to formalization of nonmonotonic reasoning and
shed a new light on the nature of rules and the negation as failure operator of Prolog.
Among other things this led to the development of the knowledge representation and
reasoning language A-Prolog discussed in this paper and several other logic programming
based languages with nonmonotonic semantics [1,16,21,24,57,127].
Unlike Prolog these languages have well-defined declarative semantics independent of
a particular inference mechanism. Unlike the ‘original’ nonmonotonic logics they are not
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super-classical. Instead they use a collection of new connectives which we believe are
often more suitable for representing various forms of nonmathematical knowledge than
their classical counterparts.
Papers published in this issue are selected from those presented at LPNMR991—5th
International Conference on Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning, held
in 1999 in El Paso, Texas. These papers are significant extensions of the respective
versions presented at the conference. They deal with several different aspects of LPNMR:
knowledge representation and reasoning [72], computational complexity [54], systems
[118], updates [2], revision [76], and applications [31]. The research work presented in
[54] received the best paper award at LPNMR99.
This introductory paper is aimed at providing potential readers with some background
information. This is not a survey of the field but rather a small collection of ideas and
results put together to help the reader to develop a ‘feel’ for the field’s history and some
of its recent developments. There is by now a substantial number of books and surveys
closely related to logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning. Accurate mathematical
exposition of the related formalisms can be found in [17,71,73,74,82]. For applications to
various aspects of knowledge representation one can look at [1,9,10,28,32,39,45,51,52,
98,100,102,115,116,122]. Issues related to reasoning methods of Prolog are discussed in
[3,97,101]. Additional information and important historical perspective can be obtained
from [7,91,92]. An in-depth coverage of many aspects of knowledge representation and
reasoning with A-Prolog can be found in the forthcoming book [8]; several logic-based
works in artificial intelligence are collected in [93].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the syntax and semantics
of A-Prolog and defines a couple of relevant syntactic fragments of it. Section 3 addresses
computational aspects; it describes algorithms for reasoning associated with A-Prolog
programs. Section 4 treats knowledge representation; it illustrates the basic methodology of
representing knowledge in A-Prolog by examples. Section 5 highlights the relationship of
A-Prolog to other nonmonotonic formalisms. Section 6 discusses the treatment of negation
in logic programming. Section 7 analyzes the computational complexity of A-Prolog
and its fragments, paying special attention to the impact of syntactic restrictions on
negation and disjunction. Section 8 comments on some general properties of the entailment
operators. Finally, Section 9 draws our conclusions.
2. The A-Prolog language
We start with a description of syntax and semantics of A-Prolog (also called Answer Set
Programming [81])—a logic programming language based on answer sets/stable model
semantics of [49,50].
1 The first LPNMR was organized in 1991 by Anil Nerode. Since that time the conference served as the main
meeting place of people interested in both subjects.
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2.1. Syntax
The syntax of A-Prolog is determined by a signature σ consisting of types, types(σ )=
{τ0, . . . , τm}, object constants obj(τ, σ )= {c0, . . . , cm} for each type τ , and typed function
and predicate constants func(σ ) = {f0, . . . , fk} and pred(σ ) = {p0, . . . , pn}. We will
assume that the signature contains symbols for integers and for the standard functions
and relations of arithmetic. Terms are built as in typed first-order languages; positive
literals (or atoms) have the form p(t1, . . . , tn), where t’s are terms of proper types and
p is a predicate symbol of arity n; negative literals are of the form ¬p(t1, . . . , tn). The
symbol ¬ is called classical or strong negation.2 Literals of the form p(t1, . . . , tn) and
¬p(t1, . . . , tn) are called contrary. By l¯ we denote a literal contrary to l. Literals and
terms not containing variables are called ground. The sets of all ground terms, atoms and
literals over σ will be denoted by terms(σ ), atoms(σ ) and lit(σ ), respectively. For a set
P of predicate symbols from σ , atoms(P,σ ) (lit(P,σ )) will denote the sets of ground
atoms (literals) of σ formed with predicate symbols from P . Consistent sets of ground
literals over signature σ , containing all arithmetic literals which are true under the standard
interpretation of their symbols, are called states of σ and denoted by states(σ ).
A rule of A-Prolog is an expression of the form
l0 or . . .or lk ← lk+1, . . . , lm,not lm+1, . . . ,not ln (1)
where li ’s are literals, not is a logical connective called negation as failure or default
negation, and or is called epistemic disjunction. The following notation will be useful
for further discussion. A set {not li , . . . ,not li+k} will be denoted by not{li , . . . , li+k}.
If r is a rule of type (1) then head(r) = {l0, . . . , lk},pos(r) = {lk+1, . . . , lm},neg(r) =
{lm+1, . . . , ln}, and body(r) = pos(r),not neg(r). A rule such that head(r) = ∅ is called
a constraint and is written as
← lk+1, . . . , lm,not lm+1, . . . ,not ln. (2)
If k = 0 then we write
l0 ← l1, . . . , lm,not lm+1, . . . ,not ln. (3)
Default negation is interpreted as a new logical connective. Intuitively not l says that there
is no reason to believe in l. Notice also the use of the symbol or instead of classical ∨. The
meaning of or differs from that of ∨. A formula A ∨ B says that “A is true or B is true”
while a rule, A or B←, may be interpreted epistemically and means “A is believed to be
true or B is believed to be true”. (This approach can be viewed as a generalization of an
2 Logic programs with two negations appeared in [50] which was strongly influenced by the epistemic
interpretation of logic programs given below. Under this view ¬p can be interpreted as “believe that p is false”
which explains the term “classical negation” used by the authors. A different view was advocated in [104,126]
where the authors considered logic programs without negation as failure but with ¬. They demonstrated that in
this context logic programs can be viewed as theories of a variant of intuitionistic logic with strong negation due
to [96]. For more recent work on this subject see [105,106]. We believe that both views proved to be fruitful and
continue to play an important role in our understanding of A-Prolog. A somewhat different view on the semantics
of programs with two negations can be found in [1].
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early work by J. Minker [90].) A rule r such that body(r)= ∅ is called a fact and is often
written as
l0 or . . .or lk. (4)
Definition 2.1. A program of A-Prolog is a pair {σ,Π} where σ is a signature and Π is a
collection of rules of the form (1). (In this paper we will often refer to programs of A-Prolog
as logic program and denote them by their second elementΠ . The corresponding signature
will be denoted by σ(Π).)
2.2. Semantics
In our definition of semantics of A-Prolog we assume that the l’s in rule (1) are ground.
Rules with variables (denoted by capital letters) will be used only as a shorthand for the sets
of their ground instantiations. This approach is justified for the so called closed domains,
i.e., domains satisfying the domain closure assumption [110] which asserts that all objects
in the domain of discourse have names in the language of Π . Even though the assumption
is undoubtedly useful for a broad range of applications, there are cases when it does not
properly reflect the properties of the domain of discourse. Semantics of A-Prolog for open
domains can be found in [9,58].
The answer set semantics of a logic program Π assigns to Π a collection of answer
sets—consistent sets of ground literals over signature σ(Π) corresponding to beliefs which
can be built by a rational reasoner on the basis of rules of Π . In the construction of these
beliefs the reasoner is assumed to be guided by the following informal principles:
• He should satisfy the rules of Π , understood as constraints of the form: If one believes
in the body of a rule one must believe in at least one of the literals from the rule’s head.
• He should adhere to the rationality principle which says that one shall not believe
anything he is not forced to believe.
The precise definition of answer sets will be first given for programs whose rules do not
contain negation as failure. Let Π be such a program and let S be a state of σ(Π).
We say that S is closed under Π if, for every rule
l0 or . . . or lk ← lk+1, . . . , lm (5)
of Π such that {lk+1, . . . , lm} ⊆ S, {l0, . . . , lk} ∩ S = ∅. (Notice that for a constraint this
condition means that the body is not contained in S.)
Definition 2.2 (Answer set—part one). A state S of σ(Π) is an answer set for Π if S is
minimal (in the sense of set-theoretic inclusion) among the sets closed under Π .
It can be shown that a program without epistemic disjunction can have at most one
answer set. To extend this definition to arbitrary programs, take any program Π , and let S
be a state of σ(Π). The reduct, ΠS , of Π relative to S is the set of rules
l0 or . . . or lk ← lk+1, . . . , lm
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for all rules (1) in Π such that {lm+1, . . . , ln} ∩ S = ∅. Thus ΠS is a program without
negation as failure.
Definition 2.3 (Answer set—part two). A state S of σ(Π) is an answer set for Π if S is an
answer set for ΠS .
(The above definition differs slightly from the original definition in [50], which allowed
the inconsistent answer set, lit(σ ). Answer sets defined in this paper correspond to
consistent answer sets of the original version.) Knowledge represented by programs
of A-Prolog is frequently used for two different reasoning tasks, associated with two
entailment relations defined below:
Definition 2.4 (Entailment relations).
(1) A program Π cautiously entails a literal l (Π |= l) if l belongs to all answer sets of Π .
(2) A programΠ bravely entails a literal l (Π |=b l) if l belongs to some answer sets of Π .
Obviously for programs having precisely one answer set, brave and cautious entailment
coincide.
Some query answering systems for A-Prolog are based on the notion on cautious
entailment; other use the brave one. Given a query l and program Π the cautious systems
will first check if Π |= l. If this is the case the cautious answer to l will be yes; if Π |= l¯ the
cautious answer will be no; otherwise it will be unknown. In contrast, the brave systems
attempt to find an answer set of Π containing l. If there is such an answer set, the brave
answer to l will be yes; otherwise it will be no.
Example 2.1. Consider for instance a logic program
Π0


p(a)← not q(a).
p(b)← not q(b).
q(a).
Using the definition of answer sets one can easily show that S0 = {q(a),p(b)} is an answer
set of this program. In the next section we will introduce simple techniques which will
allow us to show that it is the only answer set of Π0. Thus Π0 |= q(a), Π0 |= q(b),
Π0 |= ¬q(b) andΠ0’s cautious answers to queries q(a) and q(b)will be yes and unknown,
respectively. The corresponding brave answers will be yes and no.
If we expand Π0 by a rule
¬q(X)← not q(X) (6)
the resulting program
Π1 =Π0 ∪ (6)
would have the answer set S = {q(a),¬q(b),p(b)} and hence the cautious answer to query
q(b) will become no. The brave answer to q(b) will not change. (Notice however that the
brave answer to query ¬q(b) will change from no to yes.)
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Rule (6), read as “if there is no reason to believe that X satisfies q then it does not”, is
called the closed world assumption for relation q [110]. It guarantees that the reasoner’s
beliefs about q are complete, i.e., for any ground term t and every answer set S of the
corresponding program, q(t) ∈ S or ¬q(t) ∈ S.
It is worthwhile noting that the brave inference operator |=b may entail a literal l and its
contrary l¯.
Example 2.2. Consider the following program.{
p(a)← not ¬p(a).
¬p(a)← not p(a).
It is easy to see that the above program has two answer sets, namely, {p(a)} and {¬p(a)}.
Thus, both p(a) and ¬p(a) are brave consequences of the program; while the program
does not have any cautious consequence.
The cautious inference operator may entail, at the same time, a literal l and its contrary
l¯ only if the program does not have any answer set.
2.3. Program properties
In this section we discuss several useful properties of logic programs. We hope that they
help the readers to better understand the notion of answer set and to provide them with
some insight into comparatively rich mathematical theory of A-Prolog.
2.3.1. The basics
The following simple propositions [9,66,77] are frequently used to establish basic
properties of logic programs.
Proposition 2.1. For any answer set S of a logic program Π :
(a) For any rule (1) from Π , if {lk+1, . . . , lm} ⊆ S and {lm+1, . . . , ln} ∩ S = ∅ then there
exists an i , 0 i  k such that li ∈ S.
(b) If l ∈ S then l is supported by Π ; i.e., there exists a rule r ∈Π of the type (1) such
that {lk+1, . . . , lm} ⊆ S, {lm+1, . . . , ln} ∩ S = ∅, and {l0, . . . , lk} ∩ S = {l}.
Proposition 2.2. For any program Π if S0 and S1 are answer sets of Π and S0 ⊆ S1 then
S0 = S1.
Let us use these propositions to show that S0 = {q(a),p(b)} is the only answer set of
program Π0 from Example 2.1. Suppose S1 is an answer set of Π0. By Proposition 2.1 we
have that q(a) ∈ S1, q(b) /∈ S1, p(b) ∈ S1, and hence, S0 ⊆ S1. By Proposition 2.2 we have
that S0 = S1.
Programs of A-Prolog may have one, many, or zero answer sets. One can use the above
propositions and the definition of answer sets to show that programs
Π2 = {p(a)← not p(a).}
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and
Π3 = {p(a). ¬p(a).}
have no answer sets while program Π4
Π4


e(0).
e(s(s(X)))← not e(X).
p(s(X))← e(X), not p(X).
p(X)← e(X), not p(s(X)).
has an infinite collection of them.
Finally, let us look at a few examples containing connectives or and ¬. It is easy to see
that, due to the minimality condition in the definition of answer set, program
Π5 = {p(a) or p(b).}
has two answer sets, S1 = p(a) and S2 = p(b). However, it will be wrong to view epistemic
disjunction or as exclusive. We say that a conjunction Q= l1 ∧ · · ·∧ ln of literals is true in
a set S if l1, . . . , ln ∈ S; ¬Q is true in S if for some i , l¯i ∈ S; otherwise Q is undefined in
S. Obviously, neither p(a)∧ p(b) nor ¬(p(a)∧ p(b)) holds in S1, S2 and therefore Π5’s
answer to query Q will be unknown. It is instructive to contrast Π5 with a program
Π6 =Π5 ∪ {¬p(a) or ¬p(b)}
which has answer sets S3 = {p(a),¬p(b)} and S4 = {p(b),¬p(a)} and clearly contains
¬(p(a)∧ p(b)) among its consequences.
The notion of answer set is an extension of an earlier notion of stable model defined
in [49] for normal logic programs (nlp). Syntactically, an nlp is simply a logic program
consisting of rules of type (3) where l’s are atoms. But, even though stable models of
an nlp Π are identical to its answer sets, the meaning of Π under the stable model
semantics is different from that under answer set semantics. The difference is caused by
the closed world assumption ‘hard-wired’ in the definition of stable entailment |=s : an nlp
Π |=s ¬p(a) iff for every stable model S of Π , p(a) /∈ S. In other words the absence of
a reason for believing in p(a) is sufficient to conclude its falsity. To match stable model
semantics of Π in terms of answer sets, we need to expand Π by an explicit closed world
assumption,
CWA(Π)=Π ∪ {¬p(X)← not p(X)}
for every predicate symbol p of Π . Now it can be easily shown that for any ground literal
l, Π |=s l iff CWA(Π) |= l.
The next proposition (see [9,50]) shows how programs of A-Prolog can be reduced to
programs without ¬. We will need the following notation:
For any predicate p occurring in Π , let p′ be a new predicate of the same arity. The
atom p′(t1, . . . , tn) will be called the positive form of the negative literal ¬p(t1, . . . , tn).
Every positive literal is, by definition, its own positive form. The positive form of a literal l
will be denoted by l+. Π+, called positive form of Π , stands for the normal logic program
obtained from Π by replacing each rule (1) by
l+0 or . . . or l
+
k ← l+k+1, . . . , l+m,not l+m+1, . . . ,not l+n
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and adding the rules
← p(t1, . . . , tn),p′(t1, . . . , tn)
for every atom p(t1, . . . , tn) of σ(Π). For any set S of literals, S+ stands for the set of the
positive forms of the elements of S.
Proposition 2.3. A set S ⊂ lit(σ (Π)) is an answer set of Π if and only if S+ is an answer
set of Π+.
It is worthwhile noting that some answer set finders including DLV [27,42] and
SMODELS [99,118] use the above rewriting technique to implement strong negation.
2.3.2. Some syntactic properties of programs
In this section, we introduce two syntactically defined classes of logic programs with a
number of useful and interesting properties. These and similar properties are often used for
proving correctness of A-Prolog based knowledge and reasoning systems. First we need
the following
Definition 2.5. Functions || || from ground atoms of σ(Π) to ordinals are called level
mappings of Π .
Level mappings give us a useful technique for describing various classes of programs.
Definition 2.6. A logic program Π is called (locally) stratified [4,107] if there is a level
mapping || ||s of Π such that for every rule r of Π :
(1) for any l ∈ pos(r), and for any l′ ∈ head(r), ||l||s  ||l′||s ;
(2) for any l ∈ neg(r), and for any l′ ∈ head(r), ||l||s < ||l′||s .
It is easy to see that program Π0 from Section 2 is stratified while programs Π2 and Π4
are not.
Theorem 2.1. A locally stratified normal program has exactly one answer set.
The theorem is an easy consequence of the results of [4,107] which establish existence
and uniqueness of the intended (perfect) model of locally stratified logic program and the
results showing that perfect models of such programs coincide with their stable models. It is
worthwhile noting that the above statement holds for normal logic programs; the presence
of epistemic disjunction or the presence of strong negation invalidates the theorem. For
instance, the locally stratified program {a or b} has two answer sets (namely, {a} and
{b}); while the program {a,¬a}, which also is locally stratified, does not have any answer
sets at all. Theorem 2.1 is an example of a collection of results establishing existence and
uniqueness of answer sets.
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Another interesting class consists of head-cycle free programs.
Definition 2.7. A logic program Π is called head-cycle free (hcf) [11], if there is a level
mapping || ||h of Π such that for every rule r of Π :
(1) for any l ∈ pos(r), and for any l′ ∈ head(r), ||l||h  ||l′||h;
(2) for any pair l, l′ ∈ head(r), ||l||h = ||l′||h.
Example 2.3. Consider the following program Π7.
Π7
{
a or b.
a← b.
It is easy to see that Π7 is head-cycle free. Consider now program
Π8 =Π7 ∪ {b← a}.
Program Π8 is not head-cycle free, since a and b should belong to the same level by
condition (1); while they cannot by condition (2).
Among other things head-cycle free programs are interesting because epistemic
disjunction can be safely eliminated from them by “shifting” some head atoms to the bodies
of the rules. More precisely, by sh(Π) we denote the disjunction-free program obtained
from Π by substituting every rule of the form
a1 or . . .or ak ← b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn
by the following k rules:
ai ← b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn, not a1, . . . , not ai−1, not ai+1, . . . , not ak
where i ranges over interval [1 . . .k].
Theorem 2.2 [11]. If Π is a head-cycle free program, then Π and sh(Π) have exactly the
same answer sets.
It is easy to see that the head-cycle free condition is essential: program Π8 above has
answer set {a, b}; while sh(Π8) has none. Later we will show that, in general, epistemic
disjunction cannot be eliminated from A-Prolog without loss of the expressive power of
the language.
3. Reasoning algorithms of A-Prolog
There are different systems which can be used for reasoning with programs of A-Prolog.
The choice of the system normally depends on the form of the program and the type of
queries one wants to be answered. Suppose for instance that our program Π has an infinite
Herbrand universe and belongs to the class of so called acyclic programs [5]: A program is
called acyclic if it has a level mapping || || such that for any atom l occurring in the body
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of a rule with the head l0, ||l0||> ||l||. A normal acyclic logic program Π is stratified and
therefore has unique answer set. It can be shown that various queries to Π can be answered
by a variety of bottom-up evaluation algorithm (see for instance [5]). Moreover, acyclicity
of R0 together with some results from [6,120] guarantee that the SLDNF resolution based
interpreter of Prolog will always terminate on atomic queries and produce the intended
answers. Similar approximation of the A-Prolog entailment for a larger classes of programs
with unique answer sets can be obtained by the system called XSB [21] implementing the
well-founded semantics of [125]. Of course none of these traditional logic programming
inference algorithms work for programs with multiple answer sets. Some algorithms
addressing reasoning with such programs are based on the close relationship between
answer sets and truth maintenance systems [37,38,47]. In recent years however a number
of substantially more efficient algorithms were developed to reason with programs with
finite Herbrand universes, and a number of modern A-Prolog systems are now available.
Two best known systems among them are DLV [27,42] and SMODELS [118]; but also
other systems support A-Prolog to some extent, including CCALC [87], DCS [33], QUIP
[34], and DeRes [22].
In this section, we briefly sketch one of such algorithms—the procedure underlying the
computational engine of the DLV system [27,42]. Similar computational schemes are used
by other answer set finding systems such as SMODELS [118].
The first subsection illustrates a procedure for the computation of an answer set of an
A-Prolog program Π . The second subsection describes how such a procedure can be used
for answering queries.
3.1. Computing an answer set
In this subsection, we describe a method for computing an answer set of a program
Π which does not contain strong negation ¬. In the first step of the computation
an A-Prolog system replaces a program Π , which normally contains variables, by its
ground instantiation ground(Π). It is worthwhile noting that ground(Π) is not the full
set of all syntactically constructible instances of the rules of Π ; rather, it is an (often
much smaller) subset of it having precisely the same answer sets as Π . The ability
of the grounding procedure to construct small ground instantiation of the program may
dramatically affect the performance of the entire system. As shown in [40], the adoption of
database rewriting techniques has proved to be very useful for reducing the size of ground
instantiation.
Once the variables have been eliminated from Π , the hard part of the computation is
then performed on Π0 = ground(Π).
The heart of the computation is performed by the Model Generator, which is sketched in
Fig. 1. Roughly, the Model Generator produces some “candidate” answer sets of Π0. The
stability of each of them is subsequently checked by the function IsAnswerSet(I ), which
verifies whether the given “candidate” I is a minimal model of the reductΠI0 of Π0 relative
to I . The function IsAnswerSet(I ) returns true if the interpretation I at hand is an answer
set and false otherwise (see [60] for details on this function).
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Function ModelGenerator(I : Interpretation): Boolean;
var inconsistency: Boolean;
begin
I := DetCons(I );
if I = lit(σ ) then return false; (* inconsistency *);
if no atom is undefined in I then return IsAnswerSet(I );
else Select an undefined ground atom l according to a heuristic;
if ModelGenerator(I ∪ {l}) then return true;
else return ModelGenerator(I ∪ {not l});
end;
Fig. 1. Computation of answer sets.
The Model Generator is first called with parameter I set to the empty interpretation.3 If
the program Π has an answer set, then the function returns true setting I to the computed
answer set; otherwise it returns false. The Model Generator is similar to the Davis–Putnam
procedure employed by SAT solvers. It first calls a function DetCons(), which returns the
extension of I with the literals that can be deterministically inferred from I (or the set of all
literals lit(σ ) upon inconsistency). This function (see [19,41] for details) is similar to a unit
propagation procedure employed by SAT solvers, but exploits the peculiarities of A-Prolog
for making further inferences (e.g., it exploits the knowledge that every answer set is a
minimal model and must be supported). If DetCons does not detect any inconsistency, then
an atom l is selected according to a heuristic criterion and ModelGenerator is (recursively)
called on I ∪ {l} and on I ∪ {not l}, to explore whether I can be extended to an answer set
of Π . If one of such calls succeeds, then the function stops returning true, as an answer
set of Π has been found. Upon failure of both such calls, the function returns false, as I
cannot be extended to any answer set.
It is worthwhile remarking the importance of the criterion for choosing the atom l.
The atom l plays the role of a branching variable of a SAT solver. And indeed, like
for SAT solvers, the selection of a “good” atom l is crucial for the performance of
an A-Prolog system. The adopted heuristic is one of the major differences between the
existing A-Prolog systems, and often causes relevant performance gaps between them.
An experimental analysis of a number of heuristics for A-Prolog systems can be found
in [42].
3.2. Query answering
The method for computing answer sets of A-Prolog programs without ¬, illustrated in
the previous section, can be used to implement both brave and cautious reasoning with
general A-Prolog programs.
3 An interpretation is a set of ground literals representing a 3-valued state of σ(Π). An atom l can be true
(l ∈ I ), false (not l ∈ I ) or undefined with respect to an interpretation I . During the computation, undefinedness
is eliminated to eventually converge to a 2-valued state.
M. Gelfond, N. Leone / Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 3–38 15
Let L be a ground literal possibly preceded by the default negation not . By Π(L) we
denote the program Π with the addition of the following constraint: (i) ← l, if L= not l;
(ii) ← not l, if L= l. The answer sets of Π(L) are exactly the answer sets of Π where L
happens to be true.
Let Π be an A-Prolog program (possibly containing ¬) and l be a ground literal. To
answer the query l on Π , under brave and cautious entailments, one can proceed as follows.
Brave reasoning. Build the positive form Π(l)+ of Π(l).4 Evaluate program Π(l)+
as described in the previous subsection. If Π(l)+ has an answer set, then l is a brave
consequence of Π (i.e., Π |=b l); otherwise, it is not.
Cautious reasoning. Build the positive form Π(not l)+ and Π(not l¯)+ of Π(not l)
and Π(not l¯), respectively. Evaluate programs Π(not l)+ and Π(not l¯)+ as described in
the previous subsection. If Π(not l)+ does not have any answer set, then l is a cautious
consequence of Π (i.e., Π |= l). If Π(not l¯)+ does not have any answer set, then l¯ is a
cautious consequence of Π (i.e., Π |= l¯).
4. A simple knowledge base
To illustrate the basic methodology of representing knowledge in A-Prolog let us
consider the following example:
Example 4.1. Let cs be a small computer science department located in the college of
science, cos, of university, u. The department, described by the list of its members and the
catalog of its courses, is in the last stages of creating its summer teaching schedule. In this
example we outline a construction of a simple A-Prolog knowledge base K containing
information about the department. For simplicity we assume an open-ended signature
containing names, courses, departments, etc.
The list and the catalog naturally correspond to collections of atoms, say:
member(sam, cs). member(bob, cs). member(tom, cs).
course(java, cs). course(c, cs). course(ai, cs). course(logic, cs). (7)
together with the closed world assumptions expressed by the rules:
¬member(P, cs) ← not member(P, cs).
¬course(C, cs) ← not course(C, cs). (8)
The assumptions are justified by completeness of the corresponding information. The
preliminary schedule can be described by the list, say:
teaches(sam, java). teaches(bob,ai). (9)
Since the schedule is incomplete the use of CWA for teaches is not appropriate. The
corresponding program correctly answers no to query ‘member(mary, cs) ?’ and unknown
to query ‘teaches(mary, c) ?’.
4 See Section 2.3 for the definition of positive form and for its properties.
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Let us now expand our knowledge base, K, by the statement: ‘Normally, computer
science courses are taught only by computer science professors. The logic course is an
exception to this rule. It may be taught by faculty from the math department’. This is a
typical default with a weak exception5 which can be represented in A-Prolog by the rules:
¬teaches(P,C)←¬member(P, cs),
course(C, cs),
not ab(d1(P,C)),
not teaches(P,C).
ab(P, logic) ← not ¬member(P,math).
(10)
Here d1(P,C) is the name of the default rule and ab(d1(P,C)) says that default d1(P,C)
is not applicable to the pair 〈P,C〉. The second rule above stops the application of the
default to any P who may be a math professor. Assuming that
member(mary,math). (11)
is in K we have that K’s answer to query ‘teaches(mary, c) ?’ will become no while the
answer to query ‘teaches(mary, logic) ?’ will remain unknown. It may be worth noting that,
since our information about persons membership in departments is complete, the second
rule of (10) can be replaced by a simpler rule
ab(P, logic)← member(P,math). (12)
It is not difficult to show that the resulting programs have the same answer sets. To
complete our definition of teaches let us expand K by the rule which says that ‘Normally
a class is taught by one person’. This can be easily done by the rule:
¬teaches(P1,C)← teaches(P2,C),
P1 = P2,
not ab(d2(C)),
not teaches(P1,C).
(13)
Now if we learn that logic is taught by Bob we will be able to conclude that it is not taught
by Mary.
The knowledge base K we constructed so far is elaboration tolerant with respect
to simple updates. We can easily modify the departments membership lists and course
catalogs. Our representation also allows strong exceptions to defaults, e.g., statements like
teaches(john,ai). (14)
which defeats the corresponding conclusion of default (10). As expected, strong exceptions
can be inserted in K without causing a contradiction.
5 An exception to a default is called weak if it stops application of the default without defeating its conclusion.
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Let us now switch our attention to defining the place of the department in the university.
This can be done by expanding K by the rules
part(cs, cos).
part(cos, u).
part(E1,E2) ← part(E1,E),
part(E,E2).
¬part(E1,E2)← not part(E1,E2).
(15)
member(P,E1)← part(E2,E1),
member(P,E2). (16)
The first two facts form a part of the hierarchy from the university organizational chart. The
next rule expresses the transitivity of the part relation. The last rule of (15) is the closed
world assumption for part; it is justified only if K contains a complete organizational chart
of the university. If this is the case then the closed world assumption for member can be
also expanded by, say, the rules:
¬member(P,Y )← not member(P,Y ). (17)
Let us now have a closer look at our program and see how theory of A-Prolog allows
us to discover some of its interesting properties. First let us show that K has exactly one
answer set, A0.
Let K+ be the positive form of K. It is easy to see that it is locally stratified and hence,
by Theorem 2.1 has unique answer set, S+. By Proposition 2.1 we conclude that there
is no atom l such that l, (¬l)+ ∈ S+. This implies that S is consistent and hence, by
Proposition 2.3 is the only answer set of K. This fact, together with Proposition 2.1 allows
us to show that K will (correctly) entail that, say, sam is a member of the university, that u
is not part of u, etc.
The answer set of K can be computed by the DLV system directly; some minor
modifications are needed to run K on SMODELS to enforce “domain restrictedness” (see
[118]).
To check that sam is a member of the university we form a query
member(sam, u)? (18)
Asking DLV to answer member(sam, u)? on programK under cautious entailment,6 we
get precisely the response to our query. DLV also provides simple means of displaying all
the terms satisfying relations defined by a program and so we can use it to list, say, all
members of the CS faculty, etc.
Readers with some knowledge of Prolog undoubtedly noticed that K is not suitable
for the use with the Prolog interpreter. The program has a problem with left recursion in
rule (15). In addition, Prolog interpreter will flounder7 on a large number of queries to K.
6 In practice, this is done by adding member(sam, u)? to the file containing the program K, and running it on
DLV with option -FC to specify that cautious entailment is required.
7 Prolog interpreter is said to flounder if during the execution it arrives at negative query containing variables.
In Prolog floundering constitutes a serious programming error.
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Fortunately, floundering can be eliminated by the use of type predicates. A standard left
recursion elimination applied to K will replace recursive rules of (15) by
part_of (E1,E2) ← part(E1,E2).
part_of (E1,E2) ← part(E1,E),
part_of (E,E2).
¬part_of (E1,E2)← not part_of (E1,E2).
(19)
Using various termination and soundness and completeness results for Prolog type
inference (see for instance [5,6]) it is not difficult to show that if the transitive closure of
our part relation is irreflexive then Prolog interpreter terminates and returns correct answer
to queries formed by predicates part_of and member.
Let us now expand K by a new relation, offered(C,D), defined by the following, self-
explanatory, rules:
offered(C,D) ← course(C,D),
teaches(P,C).
¬offered(C,D)← course(C,D),
not offered(C,D).
(20)
Suppose also that either Tom or Bob are scheduled to teach the class in logic. A natural
representation of this fact requires disjunction and can be expressed as
teaches(tom, logic) or teaches(bob, logic). (21)
It is easy to see that the resulting program has two answer sets and that each answer set
contains offered(logic, cs). The corresponding reasoning can be done automatically by the
DLV system. The example shows that A-Prolog with disjunction allows a natural form of
reasoning by cases—a mode of reasoning not easily modeled by Reiter’s default logic.
It is worth noting that this program is head-cycle free and therefore, by Theorem 2.2 the
disjunctive rule (21) can be replaced by two nondisjunctive rules,
teaches(tom, logic)← not teaches(bob, logic).
teaches(bob, logic)← not teaches(tom, logic). (22)
and the resulting program will be equivalent to the original one. Now both, SMODELS
and DLV can be used to reason about the resulting knowledge base.
It is important to notice that development of an executable program by a series of
transformation preserving the initial (possibly nonexecutable) specification is a standard
programming methodology. The above example shows how declarativeness of A-Prolog
and development of new reasoning algorithms allowed to shorten this transformation
process and make programming easier.
Even though in the above example disjunction was eliminated by the simple transforma-
tion the complexity results [29] show that it is not always possible. Consider for instance
the following example from [18].
Example 4.2. Suppose a holding owns some companies producing a set of prod-
ucts. Each product is produced by at most two companies. We will use a relation
produced_by(P,C1,C2) which holds if a product P is produced by companies C1 and
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C2. The holding below consists of four companies producing four products and can be
represented as follows:
produced_by(p1, b, s). produced_by(p2, f, b).
produced_by(p3, b, b). produced_by(p4, s,p).
This slightly artificial representation, which requires a company producing a unique
product to be repeated twice (as in the case of p3), is used to simplify the presentation.
Suppose also that we are given a relation controlled_by(C1,C2,C3,C4) which holds if
companies C2,C3,C4 control company C1. In our holding, b and s control f , which is
represented by controlled_by(f, b, s, s).
Suppose now that the holding needs to sell some of the companies and that its policy in
such situations is to maintain ownership of so called strategic companies, i.e., companies
belonging to a minimal (with respect to the set theoretic inclusion) set S satisfying the
following conditions:
(1) Companies from S produce all the products.
(2) S is closed under relation controlled_by, i.e., if companiesC2,C3,C4 belong to S then
so is C1.
It is easy to see that for the holding above the set {b, s} is not strategic while the set {b, s, f }
is.
Suppose now that we would like to write a program which, given a holding of the above
form, computes sets of its strategic companies. In A-Prolog this can be done as follows.
Consider the rules
1. strat(C1) or strat(C2)← produced_by(P,C1,C2)
2. strat(C1) ← controlled_by(C1,C2,C3,C4),
strat(C2),
strat(C3),
strat(C4).
defining the relation strat(C) (C is strategic). Let Π be a program consisting of rules (1),
(2) and an input database X of the type described above. The first rule guarantees that, for
every answer set A of Π and every product p, there is a company c producing p such that
an atom strat(c) ∈ A. The second rule ensures that for every answer set of Π the set of
atoms of the form strat(c) belonging to this set is closed under the relation controlled_by.
Minimality of this set follows from the minimality condition in the definition of answer
set. It is not difficult to check that answer sets of Π correspond one-to-one to strategic sets
of the holding described by an input database. The DLV reasoning system can be asked to
find an answer set of Π and display atoms of the form strat from it.
It is worthwhile noting that disjunction plays a crucial role in the above example; it
is essential to encode that problem. The program is not head-cycle free, transforming
disjunction to unstratified negation would alter the semantics of the program. Moreover,
we cannot design at all another A-Prolog program encoding Strategic Companies without
using disjunction. Indeed, since the Strategic Companies problem is -P2 -hard [18], while
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normal logic programs can express “only” problems in NP (see Section 7), we can derive
that Strategic Companies cannot be expressed by a fixed normal logic program uniformly
on all collections of facts produced_by(p, c1, c2) and controlled_by(c, c1,
c2, c3) (unless NP =-P2 , an unlikely event) [18].
5. Logic programming and other nonmonotonic formalisms
Even though some affinity between logic programs and nonmonotonic logics was
recognized rather early [67,112], the intensive work investigating this phenomenon started
around 1987 after the discovery of model theoretic semantics for stratified logic programs
[4]. Almost immediately after this notion was introduced, stratified logic programs
were mapped into the three major nonmonotonic formalisms investigated at that time:
circumscription [68,107], autoepistemic logic [48] and default theories [12,78]. Further
work in this direction proved to be fruitful for logic programming as well as for artificial
intelligence. The results uncovered deep similarities between various, seemingly different,
approaches to formalization of nonmonotonic reasoning and shed a new light on the
nature of rules and negation as failure operator of Prolog. One of the results of this
direction of research was the development of A-Prolog and several other knowledge
representation languages with nonmonotonic semantics. In this section, we will give some
results establishing the relationship between A-Prolog and two other nonmonotonic logics.
5.1. A-Prolog and autoepistemic logic
We will start with an autoepistemic logic [95] whose formulas are built from proposi-
tional atoms using propositional connectives and the modal operator B .
Definition 5.1. For any sets T and E of autoepistemic formulas, E is said to be a stable
expansion of T iffE = Cn(T ∪{Bφ: φ ∈E}∪{¬Bψ: ψ /∈E})where Cn is a propositional
consequence operator.
Intuitively, T is a set of axioms and E is a possible collection of reasoner’s beliefs
determined by T . A formula F is said to be true in T if F belongs to all stable expansions
of T . If T does not contain the modal operator B , T has a unique stable expansion [79].
We will denote this expansion by Th(T ).
Let us now consider a class G of programs of A-Prolog which consists of rules of the
form:
(i) p0 ← p1, . . . , pm,not pm+1, . . . ,not pn
(ii) ¬p← not p (for every atom p) (23)
where 0  m  n. Let α be a mapping which maps rules (i) and (ii) into autoepistemic
formulas:
(i) p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pm ∧¬B pm+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬B pn ⊃ p0
(ii) ¬B p ⊃¬p (24)
and let α(Π)= {α(r): r ∈Π}.
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Proposition 5.1. For any program Π ∈G, and any set A of literals in the language of Π ,
A is an answer set of Π iff Th(A) is a stable expansion of α(Π). Moreover, every stable
expansion of α(Π) can be represented in the above form.
Mapping α is a simple generalization of the mapping from [48] where it was shown
that the declarative semantics of stratified logic programs can be characterized in terms of
the autoepistemic theory obtained by this transformation, and that therefore, negation as
failure can be understood as an epistemic operator. The stronger result establishes a one-
to-one correspondence between the stable models of an arbitrary normal logic program Π
and the stable expansions of α(Π). There are other interesting mappings of programs of
A-Prolog into autoepistemic logic and its variants (see for instance [20,70,80,117]). Even
though these results substantially increase our understanding of the situation, none of the
suggested mappings seem to provide a really good explanation of meaning of or and ←
connectives of A-Prolog in terms of autoepistemic logic.
5.2. A-Prolog and Reiter’s default theories
A Reiter’s default is an expression of the form
p :M j1, . . . ,M jn
f
(25)
where p,f and j ’s are quantifier-free first-order formulas;8 f is called the consequent
of the default, p is its prerequisite, and j ’s are its justifications. An expression M j is
interpreted as “it is consistent to believe j”. A pair 〈D,W 〉 where D is a set of defaults and
W is a set of first-order sentences is called Reiter’s default theory.
Definition 5.2. Let 〈D,W 〉 be a default theory and E be a set of first-order sentences.
Consider E0 =W and, for i  0, let Di be the set of defaults of form (25) from D such
that p ∈Ei and ¬j1 /∈ E, . . . ,¬jn /∈ E. Finally, let Ei+1 = Th(Ei) ∪ {conseq(δ): δ ∈Di}
where Th(Ei) is the set of all classical consequences of Ei and conseq(δ) denotes the δ’s
consequent. The set E is called an extension for 〈D,W 〉 if
E =
∞⋃
0
Ei.
Extensions of a default theory D play a role similar to that of stable expansions
of autoepistemic theories. The simple mapping α from programs of A-Prolog without
disjunction to default theories identifies a rule, r
l0 ← l1, . . . , lm,not lm+1, . . . ,not ln
with the default, α(r),
l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm :M l¯m+1, . . . ,M l¯n
l0
(26)
8 We limit ourselves to the quantifier-free case. For an interesting discussion on defaults with quantifiers see
[69] and [59].
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(recall that l¯ stands for the literal complementary to l).
Proposition 5.2. For any nondisjunctive program Π of A-Prolog
(i) if S is an answer set of Π , then Th(S) is an extension of α(Π);
(ii) for every extension E of α(Π) there is exactly one answer set, S, of Π such that
E = Th(S).
Thus, the class of nondisjunctive A-Prolog programs can be identified with the class
of default theories with empty W and defaults of the form (26). This proposition from
[50] is a simple extension of results from [12], and [78] where the authors considered
this relationship for normal logic programs. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it is not
easily generalized to program with disjunction. One of the problems in finding a natural
translation from arbitrary A-Prolog programs to default theories is related to the inability
to use defaults with empty justifications in reasoning by cases: The default theory with
D =
{
q :
p
,
r :
p
}
and
W = {q ∨ r}
does not have an extension containing p and therefore, does not entail p. The correspond-
ing logic program
p← q
p← r
q or r.
has two answer sets {p,q} and {p, r} and hence entails p.
6. A-Prolog and negation in logic programs
In this section we will briefly discuss the treatment of negation in logic programming.
Let us start with definite programs, i.e., programs consisting of the rules
l0 ← l1, . . . , lm (27)
where l’s are atoms. Traditionally, such programs were viewed as (complete) definitions of
objects and relations of the domain, and therefore, the lack of information about, say, truth
of p(a) was interpreter as evidence of its falsity. This is a familiar closed world assumption
which, theoretically, can be formalized as an ‘inference rule’ of the form
Π |= l
¬l (28)
or equivalently
l /∈MΠ
¬l
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where MΠ is the minimal Herbrand model of Π . Of course the above statements do not
really qualify as inference rules. First, their premises are not logical formulas, but the
statements of the meta language. Second, since nonprovability for definite programs is
undecidable it is not always possible to determine if the rule is applicable or not. As a
result a somewhat weaker version of CWA was implemented in Prolog: ¬l is derivable
from Π if the goal l has a finitely failed SLD tree with respect to Π . (For a definition of
SLD trees and other related concepts see [3] or [101].)
l has a finitely failed SLD tree
¬l . (29)
To better understand the difference between the two let us consider a program Π = {p←
p}. It is easy to see that (28) entails ¬p while (29) does not. (The Prolog interpreter
answering query p to Π will go into an infinite loop.) The difference can be used to divide
the work on semantics of negation of Prolog into two parts. One approach attempts to
formalize systems based on rule (28) and another is more interested in generalizations of
rule (29). For simplicity we limit our discussion to semantics of normal logic programs,
programs consisting of rules of the form
l0 ← l1, . . . , lm,not lm+1, . . . ,not ln (30)
where l’s are (not necessarily ground) atoms.
6.1. Clark’s completion
The research on finding a declarative semantics for the nlp negation started with the
pioneering work of Clark [30]. Given a nlp Π we can view the bodies of rules with a
predicate p in their heads as “sufficiency” conditions for inferring p from the program.
Clark suggested that the bodies of these rules can also be taken as “necessary” conditions,
with the result that negative information about p can be assumed if all these conditions are
not met. More precisely, let us consider the following two step transformation of a nlp Π
into a collection of first-order formula:
Step 1: Let r ∈ Π , head(r) = p(t1, . . . , tk), and Y1, . . . , Ys be the list of variable
appearing in r . By α1(r) we denote a formula:
∃Y1 . . .Ys :X1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧Xk = tk ∧
∧ l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm ∧¬lm+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ln ⊃ p(X1, . . . ,Xk) (31)
where, X1, . . . ,Xk are variables not appearing in r
α1(Π)= {α1(r): r ∈Π}.
Step 2: For each predicate p if
E1 ⊃ p(X1, . . . ,Xk)
...
Ej ⊃ p(X1, . . . ,Xk)
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are all the implications in α1(Π) with p in their conclusions then replace these formulas
by
∀ X1 . . .Xk : p(X1, . . . ,Xk)≡E1 ∨ · · · ∨Ej
if j  1 and by
∀X1 . . .Xk : ¬q(X1, . . . ,Xk)
if j = 0.
Definition 6.1. The resulting first-order theory combined with free equality axioms from
[30] is called Clark’s completion of Π and is denoted by Comp(Π). A literal l is entailed
by Π if l ∈ Th(Comp(Π)).
The following theorem [4] establishes the relationship between models of Clark’s
completion of Π and the notion of supported model. (A set S of atoms is supported by
Π if, for every l ∈ S, there is a rule (30) such that l1, . . . , lm ∈ S and lm+1, . . . , ln /∈ S.)
Theorem 6.1. A set S of atoms is a model of Clark’s completion of Π iff S is supported
and closed under the rules of Π .
Models of Clark’s completion may obviously differ from answer sets of Π . Program
p ← p has two Clark’s models, { } and {p}, but only one answer set { }. This shall not
be surprising—the completion semantics intends to capture the notion of finite failure
of a particular inference mechanism, SLDNF resolution, while answer sets semantics
formalizes more general notion of default negation. It is also important to note that the
above theorem immediately implies that every literal entailed by Π with respect to the
Clark’s semantics is also entailed by Π with respect to the answer set semantics.
The existence of Clark’s declarative semantics facilitated the development of the theory
of logic programs. It made possible first proofs of correctness of inference mechanism
based on SLDNF resolution, and of certain transformations of logic programs such as
fold/unfold [121], proofs of equivalence and other properties of programs. It is still
widely and successfully used for logic programming applications. Unfortunately in many
situations the Clark’s semantics appears too weak. Consider for instance the following
example:
Example 6.1. Suppose that we are given a graph, say,
edge(a, b). edge(c, d). edge(d, c).
and want to describe vertices of the graph reachable from a given vertex a. The natural
solution seems to be to introduce the rules:
reachable(a).
reachable(X) ← edge(Y,X),
reachable(Y ).
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We clearly expect vertices c and d not to be reachable. However, Clark’s completion of the
predicate ‘reachable’ gives only
reachable(X)≡ (X = a ∨ ∃Y : reachable(Y )∧ edge(Y,X))
from which such a conclusion cannot be derived.
The difficulty was recognized as serious and prompted the development of other logic
programming semantics, including that of the A-Prolog. Even though now there are
comparatively few knowledge representation languages which use Clark’s completion as
the basis for their semantics the notion didn’t loose its importance. As an illustration let us
consider its use for computing answer sets of logic programs. We will need the following
terminology.
Definition 6.2. A nlp Π is called tight if there is a level mapping || || of Π such that for
every rule (30) of Π
||l0||> ||l1||, . . . , ||lm||. (32)
Theorem 6.2. If Π is tight then S is a model of Comp(Π) iff S is an answer set of Π .
The above theorem is due to F. Fages [43]. There are some recent results extending the
notions of Clark’s completion and of tightness, and discovering more general conditions
for equivalence of the two semantics. Note that whenever the two semantics of Π are
equivalent, Π ’s answer sets can be computed by a satisfiability solver which, in some
cases, can be more efficient than the direct use of SMODELS or DLV . More on this work
can be found in [14].
6.2. Three-valued approaches
There were several important modifications of the Clark’s semantics which are based
on the use of three-valued logic. The first such modification [44,63,64], aimed at capturing
finite failure with respect to SLDNF resolution, uses three-valued completion of a program.
The following example illustrates the difference between two-valued and three valued
completions:
Example 6.2. Consider program Π9:
p ← not p.
q.
It is easy to see that COMP(Π9) is inconsistent while three-valued completion is consistent
and has a unique model in which p is undefined and q is true. This corresponds to the
behavior of the SLDNF resolution which answers yes to q and goes into the loop on
query p.
SLDNF resolution is sound with respect to the three valued completion. Unfortunately,
it can be incomplete, but as shown in [26] the only sources of incompleteness are
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floundering and unfair selection of literals in the SLDNF derivation. Since there are
multiple sufficient conditions for avoiding floundering three-valued completion and
SLDNF resolution seem to be a good match.
The well-founded semantics of [125] formalizes negation viewed as (a not necessarily
finite) failure. To give a precise definition we need the following terminology.
For any nlp Π , the function from sets of literals to sets of literals is defined by the
equation
γΠ(X)=A (33)
where A is the answer set of the reduct, ΠX , from Definition 2.3 of answer set. It is clear
that the answer sets of Π can be characterized as the fixpoints of γΠ . It is not difficult to
show that, if X ⊂ Y then γΠ(Y )⊂ γΠ(X). This implies that the function γ 2Π is monotone
and hence has the least fixpoint. Atoms belonging to this fixpoint are called well-founded
relative to Π . Atoms belonging to the complement of the greatest fixpoint of γ 2Π are called
unfounded relative to Π .
Definition 6.3. A three-valued interpretation which assigns 1 (true) to atoms well-founded
relative to Π , 0 (false) to atoms unfounded relative to Π , and 1/2 (undefined) to all the
remaining atoms is called the well-founded model of Π . A literal l is a well-founded
consequence of Π if it is true in Π ’s well-founded model.
From the above definition one can easily see that every nlp has the well-founded model
and that every well-founded consequence of Π is also Π ’s consequence with respect to
the stable model semantics. To better understand the difference between the semantics let
us look at several examples.
Example 6.3. Consider the program Π9 from Example 6.2. It has no stable model (and
hence Π9’s set of stable consequences consists of {p,¬p,q,¬q}). In contrast, the only
well-founded consequence of Π9 is q . The set of unfounded atoms is empty and the only
undefined atom is p.
Example 6.4. Consider the following program Π10:
p← not a.
p← not b.
a ← not b.
b ← not a.
Π10 has two stable models {p,a} and {p,b}. The well-founded model of Π10 has empty
sets of well-founded and unfounded atoms. Therefore, p is a consequence of Π3 in the
stable model semantics, while the answer to p in the well-founded semantics is undefined.
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Finally, let us look at the following example from [25]:
Example 6.5. Consider Π11 consisting of rules:
a ← not b.
b ← c,not a.
c ← a.
This program has one answer set {a, c}, and so has a and c as its consequences. The well-
founded model of Π11 has no well-founded atoms. Its unfounded atoms are {a, b, c} and
hence, according to the well-founded semantics, atoms a, b, and c are undefined.
There are large classes of programs for which both, well-founded and stable model,
semantics coincide. (See for instance [13,109].) The SLDNF resolution is sound with
respect to the well-founded semantics but it is not complete. Several attempts were made
to define variants of SLDNF resolution which compute answers to goals according to the
well-founded entailment. One interesting approach, SLS resolution, can be found in [108,
113]. SLS resolution is based on a type of an oracle and cannot therefore be viewed as an
algorithm. There are however several algorithms and systems which can be viewed as SLS
based approximations of the well-founded semantics [15,21]. One of the most powerful
such systems, XSB (www.cs.sunysb.edu/ sbprolog/xsb-page.html) expands SLDNF with
tabling and loop checking. Its use allows to avoid many of the loop related problems of
Prolog. For instance, XSB’s answer to query reachable(c) for program from Example 6.1
will be no (the Prolog interpreters will loop on this query).
7. Computational complexity
In this section we will give a short overview of results on the computational complexity
of A-Prolog programs.
7.1. Motivations
One may wonder why we should be interested in analyzing the complexity of A-Prolog.
This question has been addressed very clearly by Gottlob in [53], who pointed out that
there are three main reasons, why one should be interested in studying the (worst case)
complexity of logic programming formalisms. We report these reasons below.
First, the worst case complexity is a very good indicator of how many sources of
structural complexity are inherent in a problem. For example, if a problem is NP-complete,
then it contains basically one source of intractability, related to a choice to be made among
exponentially many candidates. If a problem is -P2 -complete then there are usually two
intermingled sources of complexity. For instance, the problem of checking whether an
A-Prolog program has an answer set is -P2 -complete. The two sources of complexity are
(1) the choice of a suitable interpretation which is a model of the reduct of the program
and (2) the proof that this model is minimal.
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Secondly, once the sources of complexity are identified, one can develop smart
algorithms that take these sources into account. In addition, it becomes easier to discover
tractable (i.e., polynomial) subcases by considering syntactic restrictions that eliminate all
sources of intractability.
Finally, a precise complexity classification gives us valuable information about the
algorithmic similarity and inter-translatability of different problems. For instance, both
brave reasoning on normal (or-free) A-Prolog programs and brave reasoning on head-cycle
free A-Prolog programs are NP-complete (see Table 2). Therefore, there are simple (i.e.,
polynomial) translations between these two reasoning tasks. In particular, this means that
if one has implemented a reasoning engine (theorem prover) for one of these formalisms,
this system can easily be adapted to become a reasoning engine for the other formalism.
In most cases, the translations between two decision problems that are complete for the
same complexity class can easily be deduced from the respective completeness proofs.
At least, the underlying intuitions in these proofs may help to find a suitable translation
scheme. On the other hand, if it is known that two problems are complete for different
complexity classes in the polynomial hierarchy, the existence of a polynomial translation
from the harder to the easier problem is unlikely. For example, brave reasoning with normal
(nondisjunctive) A-Prolog programs is NP-complete (see Table 2). Therefore, unless the
polynomial hierarchy collapses, a polynomial translation from full A-Prolog programs to
normal programs cannot exist.
In summary, the complexity analysis of a problem gives us much more than merely
a quantitative statement about its tractability or intractability in the worst case. Rather,
locating a problem at the right level in the polynomial hierarchy gives us a deep qualitative
knowledge about this problem. Moreover, the complexity analysis is a precious tools to
develop efficient implementations of A-Prolog systems. For instance, consider the problem
of checking whether a given set of literals is an answer set or not. This problem is
co-NP-complete for general A-Prolog programs; while it is polynomial for head-cycle free
programs (see Table 1). Consequently, a smart implementation of function IsAnswerSet()
(see Fig. 1) should be able to efficiently check this property if the program is head-cycle
free. Indeed, in the A-Prolog system DLV , the function devoted to answer set checking
recognizes whether the input program is head-cycle free or not. An efficient polynomial-
time method is then applied on head-cycle free programs; while a backtracking procedure
is employed on general (non head-cycle free) A-Prolog programs. Similar considerations
apply also to other syntactic fragments having lower complexity than the general case. For
instance, reasoning on normal stratified programs should be performed by a polynomial
time procedure (see Table 3) by an efficient A-Prolog system.
7.2. Preliminaries on complexity: the polynomial hierarchy
We assume that the reader has some aquaintance with the concepts of NP-completeness
and complexity theory, the book [103] is an excellent source for deepening the knowledge
in this field.
The classes -Pk and 8
P
k of the Polynomial Hierarchy (PH) (cf. [119]) are defined as
follows:
-P0 =8P0 = P and for all k  1, -Pk = NP-
P
k−1 ,8Pk = co--Pk .
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In particular, NP = -P1 , and co-NP = 8P1 . NPC denotes the class of problems that are
solvable in polynomial time on a nondeterministic Turing machine with an oracle for any
problem π in the class C.
The oracle replies to a query in unit time, and thus, roughly speaking, models a call
to a subroutine for π that is evaluated in unit time. If C has complete problems, then
instances of any problem π ′ in C can be solved in polynomial time using an oracle for
any C-complete problem π , by transforming them into instances of π ; we refer to this by
stating that an oracle for C is used. Notice that all classes C considered here have complete
problems.
Observe that for all k  1,
-Pk ⊆ -Pk+1 ⊆ PSPACE; and 8Pk ⊆ 8Pk+1 ⊆ PSPACE;
each inclusion is widely conjectured to be strict. Note that, by the rightmost inclusions,
all these classes contain only problems that are solvable in polynomial space. They allow,
however, a finer grained distinction between NP-hard problems that are in PSPACE.
7.3. Main problems considered
We study the complexity of the following three important decision problems arising in
A-Prolog:
• Answer Set Checking. Given an A-Prolog program Π , and a set M of ground literals
as input, decide whether M is an answer set of Π .
• Brave reasoning. Given an A-Prolog program Π , and a ground literal l, decide
whether l is true in some answer sets of Π (i.e., Π |=b l).
• Cautious reasoning. Given an A-Prolog program Π , and a ground literal l, decide
whether l is true in all answer sets of Π (i.e., Π |= l).
7.4. Complexity results
We analyze the computational complexity of the three decision problems mentioned
above for ground (i.e., propositional) A-Prolog programs. An interesting issue is the impact
of syntactical restrictions on the logic program Π . In particular, comparing the power of
disjunction with the power of negation is intriguing [29].
Starting from normal positive programs (without negation and disjunction), we consider
the effect of allowing the (combined) use of the following constructs:
• strong negation,
• stratified (nonmonotonic) negation,
• arbitrary negation,
• head-cycle free disjunction,
• arbitrary disjunction (or).
The complexity results for Answer Set Checking, Brave Reasoning and Cautious Rea-
soning over A-Prolog programs are summarized in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, respec-
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Table 1
The complexity of answer set checking in syntactic fragments of A-Prolog
{ } {¬} {nots} {¬,nots } {not} {¬,not}
{} P P P P P P
{or h} P P P P P P
{or} co-NP co-NP co-NP co-NP co-NP co-NP
Table 2
The complexity of brave reasoning in syntactic fragments of A-Prolog
{} {¬} {nots} {¬,nots} {not} {¬,not}
{} P P P P NP NP
{or h} NP NP NP NP NP NP
{or} -P2 -P2 -P2 -P2 -P2 -P2
Table 3
The complexity of cautious reasoning in syntactic fragments of A-Prolog
{} {¬} {nots} {¬,nots} {not} {¬,not}
{} P P P P co-NP co-NP
{or h} co-NP co-NP co-NP co-NP co-NP co-NP
{or} co-NPa co-NPa 8P2 8P2 8P2 8P2
a Note that here we consider the complexity of deciding if Π |= L, where L is either an atom
or an atom negated by strong negation. Deciding if Π |= not L, i.e., if there is an answer set
which does not contain L, is harder, precisely, this problem is 8P2 -complete [35].
tively. Therein, each column refers to a specific form of negation, namely: {} = no negation,
¬ = strong negation, nots = stratified negation, not = unrestricted (possibly unstratified)
negation. The lines of the tables specify the allowance of disjunction; in particular, {} =
no disjunction, orh = head-cycle free disjunction, or = unrestricted (possibly not head-
cycle free) disjunction. Each entry of the table provides the complexity class of the corre-
sponding fragment of the language. For an instance, the entry ({orh}, {nots}) defines the
fragment of A-Prolog allowing head-cycle free disjunction and stratified negation. The cor-
responding entry in Table 2, namely NP, expresses that brave reasoning for this fragment
is NP-complete. The results reported in the tables represent completeness under logspace
reductions, they are taken from [29,35,36,53].
As expected, the results for brave and cautious reasoning are symmetric in most cases,
that is, whenever the complexity of a fragment is C under brave reasoning, its complexity
is co-C under cautious reasoning (recall that co-P= P).
Strong negation does not affect at all the complexity of reasoning; each column
containing strong negation is equal to the corresponding column without it. Limiting
the forms of disjunction and nonmonotonic negation reduces the respective powers. For
disjunction free programs, brave reasoning is polynomial on stratified negation, while it
becomes NP-complete if we allow unrestricted (nonmonotonic) negation. Brave reasoning
is NP-complete on head-cycle free programs even if no form of negation is allowed. The
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complexity jumps one level higher in the polynomial hierarchy, up to -P2 -complexity,
if full disjunction is allowed. Thus, disjunction seems to be harder than negation, since
the full complexity is reached already on positive programs, even without any kind of
negation.
The picture is a bit different for cautious reasoning. Full disjunction alone is not
sufficient to get the full complexity of cautious reasoning on A-Prolog (8P2 ), which
remains in co-NP if default negation is disallowed. Intuitively, to disprove that a literal
l is a cautious consequence of a program Π , it is sufficient to find a model (which does not
need to be an answer set or a minimal model) which does not contain l. Indeed, for not-
free programs, the existence of such a model guarantees that there exists also an answer set
of Π which does not contain l. Therefore, under cautious inference, positive programs are
easier to evaluate than programs with default negation; while, this is not true under brave
inference modality.
The complexity results for Answer Set Checking, reported in Table 1, help us to
understand the complexity of reasoning. Whenever Answer Set Checking is co-NP-
complete for a fragment F , then the complexity of brave reasoning jumps up to the
second level of the polynomial hierarchy (to-P2 ). Indeed, brave reasoning on full A-Prolog
suffers of two “orthogonal” sources of complexity: (i) the exponential number of answer
set “candidates”, and (ii) the difficulty of checking whether a candidate M is an answer
set (the minimality of M can be disproved by an exponential number of subsets of M).
Now, disjunction (unrestricted or even head-cycle free) or unrestricted negation preserve
the existence of source (i); while source (ii) exists only if full disjunction is allowed (see
Table 1). As a consequence, reasoning lies at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy
(-P2 ) for the A-Prolog fragments where both such complexity sources are present; while,
it goes down to the first level of PH if only source (i) is present (unrestricted negation, or
head-cycle free disjunction), falling down to level zero (P) if both sources are eliminated.
8. Further program’s properties
In previous sections we already discussed some properties of logic programs, such as
syntactic conditions guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of answer sets, the relationship
between entailment under different semantics, soundness and completeness properties of
various inference systems and algorithms, etc. In this section we’d like to briefly comment
on some results establishing general properties of logic programming entailment relations.
Let us consider an A-Prolog program Π11 from Example 6.5. Its answer set is {a, c}
and hence both a and c are the consequences of Π11. When augmented with the fact
c the program gains a second answer set {b, c}, and loses consequence a. The example
demonstrates that the answer set entailment relation does not satisfy property:
Π |= a, Π |= b
Π ∪ {a.} |= b (34)
called cautious monotonicity. The absence of cautious monotonicity is an unpleasant
property of the answer set entailment. Among other things it prohibits the development
of general inference algorithms for A-Prolog in which already proven lemmas are simply
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added to the program. We will say that a class of programs is cautiously monotonic if
programs from this class satisfy condition (34). To give an example of such a class let us
consider a syntactic condition on programs known as order-consistency [114].
Definition 8.1. For any nlp Π and atom a, Π+a and Π−a are the smallest sets of atoms such
that a ∈Π+a and, for every rule r ∈Π ,
• if head(r) ∈Π+a then pos(r)⊆Π+a and neg(r)⊆Π−a ,
• if head(r) ∈Π−a then pos(r)⊆Π−a and neg(r)⊆Π+a .
Intuitively, Π+a is the set of atoms on which atom a depends positively in Π , and Π−a
is the set of atoms on which atom a depends negatively on Π . A program Π is order-
consistent if there is a level mapping || || such that ||b||< ||a|| whenever b ∈Π+a ∩Π−a .
That is, if a depends both positively and negatively on b, then b is mapped to a lower
stratum. It is easy to see that program Π3 from Example 6.4 is order-consistent, while
programΠ4 from Example 6.5 is not. The following important theorem is due to H. Turner
[123].
Theorem 8.1. If Π is an order-consistent program and atom a belongs to every answer set
of Π , then every answer set of Π ∪ {a.} is an answer set of Π .
This immediately implies condition (34) for order-consistent programs.
A much simpler observation guarantees that all nlp’s under the answer set semantics
have so called cut property: If an atom a belongs to an answer set X of Π , then X is an
answer set of Π ∪ {a.}.
Both results used together imply another nice property, called cumulativity: augmenting
a program with one of its consequences does not alter its consequences. More precisely,
Theorem 8.2. If an atom a belongs to every answer set of an order-consistent program Π ,
then Π and Π ∪ {a.} have the same answer sets.
Semantic properties such as cummulativity, cut, and cautious monotonicity were
originally formulated for analysis of nonmonotonic consequence relations [46,65].
Makinson’s [75] handbook article includes a survey of such properties for nonmonotonic
logics used in AI.
9. Conclusion
In this paper we described several important themes related to research on logic
programming and knowledge representation in A-Prolog. The papers in this volume
expand on these foundations. They are selected from those presented at LPNMR99—5th
International Conference on Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning, held in
1999 in El Paso, Texas. These papers are significant extensions of the respective versions
presented at the conference.
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Lifschitz’s paper [72] illustrates the application of the declarative programming
methodology of A-Prolog to the planning domain. The work by Gottlob et al. [54]
addresses some important fixed-parameter complexity questions in artificial intelligence
and nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper by Alferes et al. [2] deals with the issue of
updates in logic programming, introducing a language, called LUPS, for specifying
dynamic changes in knowledge bases. Cui and Swift [31] report on the successful
application of the preference logic grammars to the problem of data standardization.
Marek et al. [76] define an “annotated” version of the revision programs of Marek
and Truszczyn´ski. While revision programs are used to update, essentially, classical
propositional interpretations (complete databases), annotated revision programs are more
powerful allowing one to update the general “T-valuations”. Finally, Simons and Niemelä
[118] describe an interesting linguistic extension of A-Prolog, which allows us to express
cardinality constraints and weight constraints more naturally; it also illustrates one of the
most popular A-Prolog systems, SMODELS.
There is a number of other logical languages and reasoning methods which can be
viewed as alternatives to A-Prolog. They were developed in approximately the same time
frame as A-Prolog, share the same roots and a number of basic ideas. The relationship
and mutual fertilization between these approaches is a fascinated subject which was not
addressed here. For more information the interested reader can look at [1,16,21,24,57,127].
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Georg Gottlob for his contribution on complexity issues.
References
[1] J.J. Alferes, L.M. Pereira, Reasoning with Logic Programming, Springer, Berlin, 1996.
[2] J.J. Alferes, L.M. Pereira, H. Przymusinska, T.C. Przymusinski, LUPS—A language for updating logic
programs, Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 87–116, this issue.
[3] K. Apt, From Logic Programming to Prolog, C.A.R. Hoare Series, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1997.
[4] K. Apt, H. Blair, A. Walker, Towards a theory of declarative knowledge, in: J. Minker (Ed.), Foundations
of Deductive Databases and Logic Programming, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988, pp. 89–148.
[5] K. Apt, D. Pedreschi, Proving termination in general prolog programs, in: Proc. Internat. Conference on
Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 526, Springer, Berlin,
1991, pp. 265–289.
[6] K. Apt, A. Pellegrini, On the occur-check free logic programs, ACM Trans. Program. Language
Systems 16 (3) (1994) 687–726.
[7] K. Apt, R. Bol, Logic Programming and negation: A survey, J. Logic Programming 19–20 (1994) 9–71.
[8] C. Baral, Knowledge representation, reasoning and declarative problem solving with answer sets,
Unpublished manuscript, www.public.asu.edu/~cbaral/bahi/.
[9] C. Baral, M. Gelfond, Logic programming and knowledge representation, J. Logic Programming 19,20
(1994) 73–148.
[10] C. Baral, M. Gelfond, Reasoning agents in dynamic domains, in: J. Minker (Ed.), Logic Based AI, Kluwer,
Dordrecht, 2000, pp. 257–279.
[11] R. Ben-Eliyahu, R. Dechter, Propositional semantics for disjunctive logic programs, Ann. Math. Artificial
Intelligence 12 (1994) 53–87.
34 M. Gelfond, N. Leone / Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 3–38
[12] N. Bidoit, C. Froidevaux, General logical databases and programs: Default logic semantics and
stratification, J. Inform. Comput. 91 (1) (1991) 15–54.
[13] N. Bidoit, C. Froidevaux, Negation by default and unstratifiable logic programs, Theoret. Comput.
Sci. 79 (1) (1991) 86–112.
[14] Yu. Babovich, E. Erdem, V. Lifschitz, Fages’ theorem and answer set programming, in: Proc. 8th
International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Breckeridge, CO, 2000.
[15] R. Bol, L. Degerstedt, Tabulated resolution for the well-founded semantics, J. Logic Programming 34 (2)
(1998) 67–110.
[16] A. Bondarenko, P.M. Dung, R. Kowalski, F. Toni, An abstract, argumentation-theoretic approach to default
reasoning, Artificial Intelligence 93 (1–2) (1997) 63–101.
[17] G. Brewka, J. Dix, K. Konolige, Nonmonotonic Reasoning: An Overview, CSLI Publications, Stanford,
1997.
[18] M. Cadoli, T. Eiter, G. Gottlob, Default logic as a query language, IEEE Trans. Knowledge Data Engrg. 9
(3) 448–463.
[19] F. Calimeri, W. Faber, N. Leone, G. Pfeifer, Pruning operators for answer set programming systems, DBAI-
TR-01-10, Institut für Informationssysteme, Technische Universität Wien, Austria, April, 2001.
[20] J. Chen, Minimal knowledge + negation as failure = only knowing (sometimes), in: Proc. Second Internat.
Workshop on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Lisbon, 1993, pp. 132–150.
[21] W. Chen, T. Swift, D. Warren, Efficient top-down computation of queries under the well-founded semantics,
J. Logic Programming 24 (3) (1995) 161–201.
[22] P. Cholewinski, W. Marek, M. Truszczyn´ski, Default reasoning system DeReSe, in: Proc. Internat.
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Morgan Kauffman, San Mateo,
CA, 1996, pp. 518–528.
[23] A. Colmerauer, H. Kanoui, R. Pasero, P. Roussel, Un systeme de communication homme-machine en
Francais, Technical Report, Groupe de Intelligence Artificielle Université de Aix-Marseilles II, Marseilles,
1973.
[24] D. De Schreye, M. Bruynooghe, B. Demoen, M. Denecker, G. Janssens, B. Martens, Project report on
LP+: A second generation logic programming language, AI Comm. 13 (1) (2000) 13–18.
[25] J. Dix, Classifying semantics of logic programs, in: Proc. International Workshop in Logic Programming
and Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Washington, DC, 1991, pp. 166–180.
[26] W. Drabent, Completeness of SLDNF-resolution for nonfloundering queries, J. Logic Programming 27 (2)
(1996) 89–106.
[27] T. Eiter, N. Leone, C. Mateis, G. Pfeifer, F. Scarcello, A deductive system for nonmonotonic reasoning, in:
Proc. 4th Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning Conference (LPNMR-97), Lecture Notes in
Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 1265, Springer, Dagstuhl, 1997, pp. 363–374.
[28] T. Eiter, W. Faber, N. Leone, G. Pfeifer, Declarative problem solving using the DLV system, in: J. Minker
(Ed.), Logic Based AI, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 2000, pp. 79–103.
[29] T. Eiter, G. Gottlob, H. Mannila, Disjunctive Datalog, ACM Trans. Database Systems 22 (3) (1997) 364–
418.
[30] K. Clark, Negation as failure, in: H. Gallaire, J. Minker (Eds.), Logic and Data Bases, Plenum Press, New
York, 1978, pp. 293–322.
[31] B. Cui, T. Swift, Preference Logic grammars: Semantics, standardization, and application to data
standardization, Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 117–147, this issue.
[32] Y. Dimopoulos, B. Nebel, J. Koehler, Encoding planning problems in nonmonotonic logic programs, in:
Recent Advances in AI Planning, Proc. 4th European Conference on Planning, ECP-97, Lecture Notes in
Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 1348, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 169–181.
[33] D. East, M. Truszczyn´ski, dcs: An implementation of DATALOG with Constraints, in: Proc. 8th
International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning (NMR-2000), Breckenridge, CO, 2000.
[34] U. Egly, T. Eiter, H. Tompits, S. Woltran, Solving advanced reasoning tasks using quantified boolean
formulas, in: Proc. AAAI-00 2000, Austin, TX, AAAI Press/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, pp. 417–
422.
[35] T. Eiter, G. Gottlob, On the computational cost of disjunctive logic programming: Propositional case, Ann.
Math. Artificial Intelligence 15 (3–4) (1995) 289–323.
M. Gelfond, N. Leone / Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 3–38 35
[36] T. Eiter, N. Leone, D. Saccá, Expressive power and complexity of partial models for disjunctive deductive
databases, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 206 (1–2) (1998) 181–218.
[37] C. Elkan, A rational reconstruction of nonmonotonic truth maintenance systems, Artificial Intelligence 43
(1990) 219–234.
[38] K. Esghi, Computing stable models by using the ATMS, in: Proc. AAAI-90, Boston, MA, 1990, pp. 272–
277.
[39] E. Erdem, V. Lifschitz, M. Wong, Wire routing and satisfiability planning, in: Proc. CL-2000, 2000,
pp. 822–836.
[40] W. Faber, N. Leone, C. Mateis, G. Pfeifer, Using database optimization techniques for nonmonotonic
reasoning, in: Proc. 7th International Workshop on Deductive Databases and Logic Programming (DDLP-
99), Japan, 1999, pp. 135–139.
[41] W. Faber, N. Leone, G. Pfeifer, Pushing goal derivation in DLP computations, in: Proc. 5th International
Conference on Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning (LPNMR-99), El Paso, TX, Lecture
Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 1730, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 177–191.
[42] W. Faber, N. Leone, G. Pfeifer, Experimenting with heuristics for answer set programming, in: Proc. IJCAI-
01, Seattle, WA, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 2001, pp. 635–640.
[43] F. Fages, Consistency of Clark’s completion and existence of stable models, J. Methods Logic Comput.
Sci. 1 (1) (1994) 51–60.
[44] M. Fitting, A Kripke–Kleene semantics for logic programs, J. Logic Programming 2 (4) (1985) 295–312.
[45] E. Franconi, A. Laureti Palma, N. Leone, S. Perri, F. Scarcello, Census data repair: A challenging
application of disjunctive logic programming, in: Proc. LPAR-01, Cuba, Springer, Berlin, 2001.
[46] D. Gabbay, Theoretical foundations for nonmonotonic reasoning in expert systems, in: K.R. Apt (Ed.),
Proc. NATO Advanced Study Institute on Logics and Models of Concurrent Systems, La Colle-sur-Loup,
France, Springer, Berlin, 1985, pp. 439–457.
[47] L. Giordano, A. Martelli, Generalized stable models, truth maintenance and conflict resolution, in: D.
Warren, P. Szeredi (Eds.), Logic Programming: Proc. Seventh International Conference, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1990, pp. 427–441.
[48] M. Gelfond, On stratified autoepistemic theories, in: Proc. AAAI-87, Seattle, WA, 1987, pp. 207–211.
[49] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, The stable model semantics for logic programming, in: R. Kowalski, K. Bowen
(Eds.), Logic Programming: Proc. Fifth Internat. Conference and Symposium, 1988, pp. 1070–1080.
[50] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, Classical negation in logic programs and disjunctive databases, New Generation
Comput. (1991) 365–387.
[51] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, Representing actions and change by logic programs, J. Logic Programming 17,
301–323.
[52] M. Gelfond, T. Son, Reasoning with prioritized defaults, in: J. Dix, L.M. Pereira, T. Przymusinski (Eds.),
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 1471, Springer, Berlin, 1998, pp. 164–224.
[53] G. Gottlob, Complexity and expressive power of disjunctive logic programming, in: Proc. International
Logic Programming Symposium (ILPS-94), Ithaca, NY, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994, pp. 23–42.
[54] G. Gottlob, F. Scarcello, M. Sideri, Fixed-parameter complexity in AI and nonmonotonic reasoning,
Artificial Intelligence 130 (2002) 55–86, this issue.
[55] C. Green, Theorem proving by resolution as a basis for question—Answering systems, in: B. Meltzer, D.
Michie (Eds.), Machine Intelligence, Vol. 4, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1969, pp. 183–205.
[56] P. Hayes, Computation and deduction, in: Proc. Second Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of
Computer Science, Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences, Czechoslovakia, 1973, pp. 105–118.
[57] A.C. Kakas, R. Kowalski, F. Toni, The role of abduction in logic programming, in: D.M. Gabbay, C.J.
Hogger, J.A. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol. 5,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 235–324.
[58] M. Kaminski, A note on the stable model semantics of logic programs, Artificial Intelligence 96 (2) (1997)
467–479.
[59] M. Kaminski, A comparative study of open default theories, Artificial Intelligence 77 (2) (1995) 285–319.
[60] C. Koch, N. Leone, Stable model checking made easy, in: Proc. IJCAI-99, Stockholm, Sweden, Morgan
Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1999, pp. 70–75.
[61] R. Kowalski, Predicate logic as a programming language, in: J.L. Rosenfeld (Ed.), Information Processing
74, Proceedings of IFIP Congress 74, Stockholm, Sweden, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1974, pp. 569–574.
36 M. Gelfond, N. Leone / Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 3–38
[62] R. Kowalski, Logic for Problem Solving, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.
[63] K. Kunen, Negation in logic programming, J. Logic Programming 4 (4) (1987) 289–308.
[64] K. Kunen, Signed data dependencies in logic programs, J. Logic Programming 7 (3) (1989) 231–245.
[65] D. Lehmann, What does a conditional knowledge base entail?, in: Proc. KR-89, Toronto, ON, 1989,
pp. 212–221.
[66] N. Leone, P. Rullo, F. Scarcello, Disjunctive stable models: Unfounded sets, fixpoint semantics and
computation, Inform. and Comput. 135 (2) (1997) 69–112.
[67] V. Lifschitz, Closed-world databases and circumscription, Artificial Intelligence 27 (1985) 229–235.
[68] V. Lifschitz, On the declarative semantics of logic programs with negation, in: J. Minker (Ed.), Foundations
of Deductive Databases and Logic Programming, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988, pp. 177–192.
[69] V. Lifschitz, On open defaults, in: J. Lloyd (Ed.), Computational Logic: Symposium Proceedings, Springer,
Berlin, 1990, pp. 80–95.
[70] V. Lifschitz, G. Schwarz, Extended logic programs as autoepistemic theories, in: Proc. Second Internat.
Workshop on Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Lisbon, 1993, pp. 101–114.
[71] V. Lifschitz, Foundations of logic programming, in: G. Brewka (Ed.), Principles of Knowledge Represen-
tation, CSLI Publications, 1996, pp. 69–128.
[72] V. Lifschitz, Answer set programming and plan generation, Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 39–54, this
issue.
[73] V. Lifschitz, Circumscription, in: D.M. Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, J.A. Robinson (Eds.), The Handbook on
Logic in AI and Logic Programming, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 298–352.
[74] J. Lobo, J. Minker, A. Rajasekar, Foundations of Disjunctive Logic Programming, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1992.
[75] D. Makinson, General patterns in nonmonotonic reasoning, in: D.M. Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, J.A. Robinson
(Eds.), The Handbook on Logic in AI and Logic Programming, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1993, pp. 35–110.
[76] V. Marek, I. Pivkina, M. Truszczyn´ski, Annotated revision programs, Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002)
149–180, this issue.
[77] W. Marek, V.S. Subrahmanian, The relationship between logic program semantics and nonmonotonic
reasoning, in: G. Levi, M. Martelli (Eds.), Proc. Sixth Internat. Conference on Logic Programming, Lisbon,
Portugal, 1989, pp. 600–617.
[78] W. Marek, M. Truszczyn´ski, Stable semantics for logic programs and default reasoning, in: E. Lusk,
R. Overbeek (Eds.), Proc. North American Conference on Logic Programming, Cleveland, OH, 1989,
pp. 243–257.
[79] W. Marek, M. Truszczyn´ski, Autoepistemic logic, J. ACM 3 (38) (1991) 588–619.
[80] W. Marek, M. Truszczyn´ski, Reflexive autoepistemic logic and logic programming, in: Proc. Second In-
ternat. Workshop on Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Lisbon, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1993, pp. 115–131.
[81] W. Marek, M. Truszczyn´ski, Stable models and an alternative logic programming paradigm, in: The Logic
Programming Paradigm: A 25-Year Perspective, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 375–398.
[82] W. Marek, M. Truszczyn´ski, Nonmonotonic Logic, Springer, Berlin, 1993.
[83] J. McCarthy, Programs with common sense, in: Proc. Teddington Conference on the Mechanization of
Thought Processes, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1959, pp. 75–91.
[84] J. McCarthy, P. Hayes, Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence, in: B.
Meltzer, D. Michie (Eds.), Machine Intelligence, Vol. 4, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1969,
pp. 463–502.
[85] J. McCarthy, Circumscription—A form of nonmonotonic reasoning, Artificial Intelligence 13 (1–2) (1980)
27–39.
[86] J. McCarthy, Applications of circumscription to formalizing common sense knowledge, Artificial
Intelligence 26 (3) (1986) 89–116.
[87] N. McCain, H. Turner, Satisfiability planning with causal theories, in: Proc. Sixth International Conference
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-98), Trento, Italy, Morgan Kaufmann, San
Mateo, CA, 1998, pp. 212–223.
[88] D. McDermott, Nonmonotonic logic II: Nonmonotonic modal theories, J. ACM 29 (1) (1982) 33–57.
[89] D. McDermott, J. Doyle, Nonmonotonic logic I, Artificial Intelligence 13 (1–2) (1980) 41–72.
M. Gelfond, N. Leone / Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 3–38 37
[90] J. Minker, On indefinite data bases and the closed world assumption, in: Proc. CADE-82, New York, 1982,
pp. 292–308.
[91] J. Minker, Overview of disjunctive logic programming, Ann. Math Artificial Intelligence 12 (1994) 1–24.
[92] J. Minker, Logic and Databases: A 20 year retrospective, in: H. Levesque, F. Pirri (Eds.), Logical
Foundations for Cognitive Agents: Contributions in Honor of Ray Reiter, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 234–
299.
[93] J. Minker (Ed.), Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 2000.
[94] M. Minsky, A framework for representing knowledge, in: P. Winston (Ed.), The Psychology of Computer
Vision, McGraw-Hill, New York, pp. 211–277.
[95] R. Moore, Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic, Artificial Intelligence 25 (1) (1985) 75–94.
[96] D. Nelson, Constructible falsity, J. Symbolic Logic 14 (1949) 16–26.
[97] A. Nerode, R. Shore, Logic for Applications, Springer, Berlin, 1997.
[98] I. Niemelä, Logic programs with stable model semantics as a constraint programming paradigm, Ann.
Math. Artificial Intelligence 25 (3–4) (1999) 241–273.
[99] I. Niemelä, P. Simons, Smodels—An implementation of the stable model and well-founded semantics for
normal logic programs, in: Proc. 4th International Conference on Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic
Reasoning, Dagstuhl, Germany, 1997, pp. 421–430.
[100] T. Soininen, I. Niemelä, Developing a declarative rule language for applications in program configuration,
in: Practical Aspects of Declarative Languages, Lecture Notes in Conputer Science, Vol. 1551, Springer,
Berlin, 1999, pp. 305–319.
[101] U. Nilsson, J. Maluszynski, Logic, Programming and Prolog, www.ida.liu.se/~ulfni/lpp.
[102] M. Nogueira, M. Balduccini, M. Gelfond, R. Watson, M. Barry, A-Prolog decision support system for the
Space Shuttle, in: Proc. Third International Symposium on Practical Aspects of Declarative Languages,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1990, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 169–183.
[103] C.H. Papadimitriou, Computational Complexity, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1994.
[104] D. Pearce, G. Wagner, Reasoning with negative information 1—Strong negation in logic programming,
Technical Report, Gruppe fur Logic, Wissentheorie and Information, Freie Universität Berlin, 1989.
[105] D. Pearce, A new logical characterization of stable models and answer sets, in: J. Dix, L. Pereira,
T. Przymusinski (Eds.), Nonmonotonic Extensions of Logic Programming, Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence, Vol. 1216, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 57–70.
[106] D. Pearce, From here to there: Stable negation in logic programming, in: D. Gabbay, H. Wansing (Eds.),
What is Negation?, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999.
[107] T. Przymusinski, On the declarative semantics of deductive databases and logic programs, in: J. Minker
(Ed.), Foundations of Deductive Databases and Logic Programming, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA,
1988, pp. 193–216.
[108] T. Przymusinski, Every logic program has a natural stratification and an iterated fixed point model, in: Proc.
8th Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, Philadelphia, PA, 1989, pp. 11–21.
[109] H. Przymusinska, T. Przymusinski, Weakly perfect model semantics for logic programs, in: R.A. Kowalski,
K.A. Bowen (Eds.), Proc. 5th International Conference and Symposium on Logic Programming, Seattle,
WA, 1988, pp. 1106–1120.
[110] R. Reiter, On closed world data bases, in: H. Gallaire, J. Minker (Eds.), Logic and Data Bases, Plenum
Press, New York, 1978, pp. 119–140.
[111] R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Artificial Intelligence 13 (1–2) (1980) 81–132.
[112] R. Reiter, Circumscription implies predicate completion (sometimes), in: Proc. AAAI-82, Pittsburgh, PA,
1982, pp. 418–420.
[113] K. Ross, A procedural semantics for well-founded negation in logic programs, J. Logic Programming 13
(1992) 1–22.
[114] T. Sato, Completed logic programs and their consistency, J. Logic Programming 9 (1990) 33–44.
[115] C. Sakama, K. Inoue, Prioritized logic programming and its application to commonsense reasoning,
Artificial Intelligence 123 (1–2) (2000) 185–222.
[116] M. Shanahan, Solving the Frame Problem: A Mathematical Investigation of the Commonsense Law of
Inertia, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997.
[117] G. Schwarz, Autoepistemic logic of knowledge, in: A. Nerode, V. Marek, V.S. Subrahmanian (Eds.), Logic
Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Proc. First Internat. Workshop, 1991, pp. 260–274.
38 M. Gelfond, N. Leone / Artificial Intelligence 138 (2002) 3–38
[118] P. Simons, I. Niemelä, T. Soininen, Extending and implementing the stable model semantics, Artificial
Intelligence 138 (2002) 181–234, this issue.
[119] L. Stockmeyer, Classifying the computational complexity of problems, J. Symbolic Logic 52 (1) (1987)
1–43.
[120] K. Stroetman, A completeness result for SLDNF-resolution, J. Logic Programming 15 (1993) 337–355.
[121] H. Tamaki, T. Sato, Unfold/fold transformation of logic programs, in: S. Tarnlund (Ed.), Proc. 2nd
International Logic Programming Conference, Uppsala, Sweden, 1984, pp. 127–138.
[122] H. Turner, Representing actions in logic programs and default theories, J. Logic Programming 31 (1–3)
(1997) 245–298.
[123] H. Turner, Order-consistent programs are cautiously monotonic, Theory and Practice of Logic Program-
ming 1 (4) (2001) 487–495.
[124] M. van Emden, R. Kowalski, The semantics of predicate logic as a programming language, J. ACM 23 (4)
(1976) 733–742.
[125] A. Van Gelder, K. Ross, J. Schlipf, The well-founded semantics for general logic programs, J. ACM 38 (3)
(1991) 620–650.
[126] G. Wagner, Logic programming with strong negation and inexact predicates, J. Logic Comput. 1 (6) (1991)
835–861.
[127] J.-H. You, L. Yuan, A three-valued semantics for deductive databases and logic programs, J. Comput.
System Sci. 49 (1994) 334–361.
